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Introductions of the new influenza A(H1N1) variant virus in the 
Netherlands led to enhanced surveillance and infection control. 
By 24 June 2009, 115 cases were reported, of whom 44% were 
indigenously acquired. Severity of disease is similar to reports 
elsewhere. Our point estimate of the effective reproductive number 
(Re) for the initial phase of the influenza A(H1N1)v epidemic in the 
Netherlands was below one. Given that the Re estimate is based 
on a small number of indigenous cases and a limited time period, 
it needs to be interpreted cautiously.
Introduction
The first human infections with the new influenza A(H1N1) 
variant virus [A(H1N1)v], a novel triple reassortant swine influenza 
virus, were diagnosed in two patients in the United States on 14 
and 17 April 2009 [1]. Subsequently, this virus was identified 
as the cause of a large, ongoing epidemic of respiratory disease 
in Mexico [2]. Following the report of community transmission 
in more than two regions, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared on 11 June 2009  the outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v to 
be a pandemic [3]. In this short report we summarise the infection 
control and surveillance activities undertaken in the Netherlands in 
response to the emergence of influenza A(H1N1)v, as well as the 
epidemiological characteristics of the first 115 laboratory confirmed 
cases.
Infection control and case finding
In response to the emergence of the new, potentially pandemic, 
A(H1N1)v strain of influenza virus, the Centre for Infectious 
Disease Control of the National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands advised on 25 April that 
individuals who developed fever within seven days after returning 
from Mexico should consult their general practitioner (GP) by 
telephone. On 29 April, new influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection 
was upgraded to a Category A notifiable disease, requiring doctors 
and laboratories to report the name of the patient to the Municipal 
Health Service when the disease was suspected or identified. 
Notifications are entered by Municipal Health Services into a 
national anonymous web-based database, including information 
on travel history, contact with symptomatic cases and clinical 
symptoms. Enhanced surveillance was carried out for clusters and 
for suspected patient-to-healthcare worker transmissions. 
The case definitions (Table) were based on the European Union 
case definitions [4]. 
Indigenous cases were defined as cases with no history of 
travel abroad during the incubation period. In this report we only 
include laboratory-confirmed cases. Case finding was carried out by 
Municipal Health Services, who set out to offer laboratory testing 
to all reported possible cases of A(H1N1)v from 29 April onwards. 
Case finding was enhanced by testing all household and other 
close contacts of confirmed cases. From 28 May travellers with 
fever within seven days of arriving from the United States were 
also advised to consult their GP. As of 23 June, contacts (even if 
symptomatic) are no longer required to be tested for A(H1N1)v, 
unless this is indicated for their clinical management. 
To control the spread of infection and attenuate disease in those 
infected, oseltamivir treatment was recommended from 30 April 
onwards for all possible, probable and confirmed cases, and for 
their contacts, irrespective of symptoms. This included airplane 
passengers seated in the same row as the index case as well as 
those in the two rows in front and behind. Infected individuals were 
advised to stay indoors for at least 10 days after the date of onset 
or shorter if laboratory testing turned negative after day five. The 
national pandemic influenza preparedness plan includes detailed 
instructions for protective equipment for health care workers [5]. 
Entry screening at airports, school closure and hospitalisation for 
infection control purposes have not been employed. 
As of 23 June, asymptomatic contacts of confirmed cases are no 
longer recommended to receive oseltamivir. However, symptomatic 
contacts of laboratory-confirmed cases are still recommended to be 
treated with oseltamivir, and they continue to be notifiable.
Laboratory methods
Laboratory testing is carried out by the National Influenza Centre 
in the Netherlands (represented by Erasmus Medical Centre, 
Rotterdam and RIVM, Bilthoven) using general influenza A and 
A(H1N1)v specific real-time RT-PCR, initially with confirmation 
by sequence analysis [6]. Results of laboratory testing have been 
available within 32 hours after sampling to allow timely oseltamivir 
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Methods to estimate key epidemiological parameters
For all indigenous cases we tried to identify a most probable 
source  by  examining  the  patients’  contact  history  reported 
by Municipal Health Services who interviewed cases. For all 
epidemiologically linked cases, we subsequently estimated the 
generation interval as the average number of days between the 
dates of symptom onset in the source case and in the secondary 
case. 
To estimate the effective reproduction number (Re), we divided 
the epidemiological curve in windows of duration equal to the 
estimated generation interval. For each pair of successive windows 
in the period from 30 May to 18 June we calculated the ratio 
Ta b l e
Case definitions for new influenza A(H1N1)v [4]
Clinical criteria
Any person with one of the following three:
•	 fever > 38 °C AND signs and symptoms of acute respiratory infection,
•	 pneumonia (severe respiratory illness),
•	 death from an unexplained acute respiratory illness.
Laboratory criteria
At least one of the following tests:
•	 RT-PCR,
•	 viral culture (requiring BSL 3 facilities),
•	 four-fold rise in novel influenza virus A(H1N1) specific neutralising antibodies (implies the need for paired sera, from acute phase illness and 
then at convalescent stage 10-14 days later minimum).
Epidemiological criteria
At least one of the following three in the seven days before disease onset:
•	 a person who was a close contact to a confirmed case of novel influenza A(H1N1) virus infection while the case was ill,
•	 a person who has travelled to an area where sustained human-to-human transmission of novel influenza A(H1N1) is documented,
•	 a person working in a laboratory where samples of the novel influenza A(H1N1) virus are tested.
Case classification
A. Case under investigation
Any person meeting the clinical and epidemiological criteria.
B. Probable case
Any person meeting the clinical AND epidemiological criteria AND with a laboratory result showing positive influenza A
infection of an unsubtypable type.
C. Confirmed case
Any person meeting the laboratory criteria for confirmation.
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Cases of laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection by day of symptom onset and import status, the Netherlands, reported 
between 29 April and 24 June 2009 (n=108, further seven asymptomatic cases, of which one was imported, are not included)
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between the number of indigenous cases in one window and 
the total number of cases in the previous window. Re was then 
estimated by the average of this ratio.
Results 
Incidence and travel history
On 30 April the first laboratory-confirmed case of A(H1N1)v in 
the Netherlands was reported in a three-year-old girl who on 27 
April returned with her parents from a family visit in Mexico. By 24 
June, 115 confirmed cases were reported, of whom 64 (56%) were 
most likely imported and 51 (44%) were indigenously acquired 
(Figure 1). Three of the indigenous cases were in individuals who 
had not been in contact with any known case or cluster. These 
sporadic cases were tested for the new influenza A(H1N1)v virus 
because they presented with influenza-like illness (n=2) or viral 
pneumonia (n=1). So far, no cases of influenza A(H1N1)v have 
been detected in the sentinel influenza surveillance. 
Clinical picture and vaccination status
None of the 115 reported confirmed cases has died. Two (2%) 
have been admitted to hospital, including a previously physically 
fit man who required admission to an intensive care department 
with severe viral pneumonia. He was tested for influenza A(H1N1)
v after presenting with respiratory failure. He had not been in 
contact with any known cases, and had not travelled during the 
incubation period. The other hospital admission concerned a tourist 
with asthma visiting the Netherlands. She presented with influenza-
like symptoms, and did not have pneumonia. She was admitted for 
social indications, and was discharged after less than 24 hours. 
One further case had clinically diagnosed pneumonia but was 
not admitted to hospital. Of all cases for whom information was 
available (n=46), three (7%) had underlying chronic illnesses. No 
cases in pregnant women have been reported.
Of the 48 indigenous, non-sporadic cases, six (13%) were 
asymptomatic at the time of sampling. It is yet unknown, however, 
whether they became symptomatic after sampling. Symptoms 
reported by laboratory-confirmed, symptomatic cases for whom 
this information was available included: sore throat, cough and/or 
coryza (93 cases, 90%), fever >=38˚C (76 cases, 88%), myalgia 
(54 cases, 52%) and diarrhoea (9 cases, 9%).  
Of 111 cases for whom the seasonal influenza vaccination status 
for 2008-9 was known, 17 (15%, 95% CI 9-23%) reported to 
have been vaccinated. In 2007, an estimated 10% of the practice 
populations of less than 65 years of age of GPs participating to 
a research network (LINH, the National Information Network of 
General Practice) were vaccinated, whilst 15% were targeted for 
vaccination [7]. In our case-series, 7% of cases below 65 years 
of age were in the target group for seasonal influenza vaccination 
due to underlying illnesses (see above), and only two cases were 
65 years or older. The relatively high vaccine coverage among 
cases compared to the coverage among the general population 
is consistent with a lack of effectiveness of the 2008-9 seasonal 
influenza vaccine against the new influenza A(H1N1)v [8]. 
Epidemiological characteristics
Indigenous cases were younger than imported cases, with a 
median age of 18 and 31 years, respectively (p<0.05, Figure 2). 
Cases occurred in most Municipal Health Service regions, with 
three main clusters of indigenous transmission (Figure 3). 
Of the 51 indigenous cases, 36 cases could be epidemiologically 
linked to an index case, 12 cases could be linked to a cluster and 
three cases were sporadic. Of four indigenous cases in healthcare 
workers who did not report contact with a case outside of work, 
one was considered as resulting from patient to healthcare worker 
transmission. 
In total, nine clusters of more than one case were identified, 
including three larger clusters with 19, 12 and 9 cases, respectively. 
The mean generation (or serial) interval for these clusters was 2.5 
days (standard deviation (SD) 0.9 days, cluster of 19 cases, n=13), 
3.1 days (SD 1.1 days, cluster of 12 cases, n=8) and 2.8 days (SD 
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Cases of laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1)v by Municipal 
Health Service region, the Netherlands, 29 April – 24 June 2009 
(n=115)
Source data: RIVM-CIb
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Cases of laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1)v by age  group 
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1.7 days, cluster of 9 cases, n=5). Overall, the generation interval 
was 2.7 days (SD 1.1, N=32).
Based on this, we applied a generation interval of three days 
as moving average window to the epidemic curve. The mean ratio 
of the number of indigenous cases in one window to the total 
number of cases in the previous window (the effective reproductive 
number Re) was 0.5 between 30 May and 18 June. We did not 
include cases with a date of onset after 18 June and due to the 
reporting delay we may have missed cases in this period, which 
would have resulted in an underestimation of Re. We observed 
that no epidemiological links could be traced back to the seven 
asymptomatic cases, suggesting a very low Re for asymptomatic 
cases. However, due to the small number of indigenous cases, the 
confidence bounds on these estimates of Re can be considered to 
be very wide. The implicitly assumed delta distribution gives an 
upward bias in the point estimate of Re. However, as the SD of the 
generation interval was small relative to the doubling time of the 
epidemic, this bias is negligible [9].
Conclusions
Despite repeated introductions of the new influenza A(H1N1)
v into the Netherlands, our enhanced surveillance results suggest 
that indigenous transmission of this virus has remained relatively 
limited. A large proportion of cases were imported, and only 15% of 
these caused secondary cases. Moreover, only three clusters of more 
than four cases were detected, all relatively limited in size. This 
suggests that the Re was below one, consistent with our estimate 
of Re based on the epidemiological curve. Our point estimate of 
Re for the influenza A(H1N1)v epidemic in the Netherlands was 
lower than the R0 estimated for Mexico or the US [10]. However, 
as the number of indigenous cases was low, this point estimate 
needs to be considered cautiously. The estimated Re was based 
on observations in the period 30 May and 18 June, and is likely 
to change in future months. Explanations for the relatively low Re 
estimate may include the rigorous case-finding and infection control 
implemented in the Netherlands following the introductions of the 
influenza A(H1N1)v virus. However, our data do not allow drawing 
conclusions on the effectiveness of this policy. Our observations are 
consistent with an absence of effectiveness of the 2008-9 seasonal 
influenza vaccine against the current pandemic strain.
The incidence of reported cases of influenza A(H1N1)v in the 
Netherlands is much lower than in the United Kingdom [11]. This 
may reflect the phase of epidemic; the epidemic in the UK could 
be more advanced due to earlier and more frequent introductions, 
especially from the US. It may also reflect chance effects early on 
in the epidemic, where introductions into schools are likely to lead 
to intense transmission. 
The clinical picture and severity of disease among our cases is 
similar to what was reported elsewhere [12]. However, due to the 
limited time of follow-up, we may have somewhat underestimated 
the severity in our report.
The occurrence of a new strain of influenza virus coupled with 
intense efforts to control it offer a unique opportunity to document 
its key epidemiological, virological and pathogenetic properties. 
This information is crucial for modeling aiming to predict the future 
burden of disease and to design strategies for most effective control 
of this pandemic. However, changes to the strain’s properties, 
including emergence of resistance, would render these predictions 
invalid. Continued surveillance is therefore of key importance.
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